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Abstract 
 
This paper outlines the design of an intraday 
market-based mechanism for coordinated scheduling 
of gas-fired electric generation, intra-day natural gas 
purchases, sales and deliveries, and underlying 
pipeline operation. The mechanism is based on an 
exchange of physical and pricing data between 
participants in each market, with price formation in 
both markets being fully consistent with the physics of 
energy flow.  In organized nodal electricity markets, 
prices are consistent with the physical flow of electric 
energy in the power grid because the economic 
optimization used to clear the market accounts for the 
physics of power flows.  In the gas system, the 
proposed physical operation and pricing will be based 
on the transient optimization approach that accounts 
for physical and engineering factors of pipeline 
hydraulics and compressor station operations. The 
paper provides theoretical foundations for the market 
mechanism.  
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The growing reliance of the bulk electric power 
system on gas-fired generation increased the need to 
improve the coordination between wholesale natural 
gas and electricity markets.  
 Replacement of coal fired and nuclear plants with 
gas-fired generating capacity significantly increases the 
amount of natural gas used as fuel for power 
generation.  In parallel, the variability of electric 
generation from wind and solar increases the 
variability of pipeline deliveries to gas-fired generators 
used to balance the electric grid.  The resulting intra-
day and even sub-hourly swings in demand for natural 
gas as a fuel for electric generation create new 
challenges for pipeline operators, and - poses reliability 
risks for both gas pipelines and electric systems.   
The need to better coordinate -both sectors to 
mitigate these risks is well recognized, and is reflected 
in the - Orders 787 and 809 by the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC), which regulates 
access to pipeline capacity [1,2].  Coordination 
mechanisms proposed to date are based on widening 
the scope of operational information exchanges 
between the –two sectors, and on adjusting the timing 
of these exchanges [3].  While these measures are 
helpful, a truly efficient coordination should be based 
on timely exchange of both physical and pricing data, 
with price formation in both markets being fully 
consistent with the physics of energy flow.  
Electricity prices consistent with the physical flow 
of electric energy in the power grid are the outcome of 
economic optimization of power system operation in 
organized electricity markets administered by Regional 
Transmission Organizations (RTOs) [4, 5].  A similar 
optimization approach that accounts for physical and 
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engineering factors of gas pipeline - and compressor 
station operations would lead to location- and time-
dependent economic value of natural gas consistent 
with the physics of gas flow.  Such an approach have 
been formulated in [6] under the simplified assumption 
of steady state pipeline flows.  A more general 
formulation considers a truly dynamic transient flow of 
natural gas  
This paper relies on Ref. [8] in which a transient 
pipeline optimization problem that maximizes total 
market surplus over supply and offtake schedules has 
been formulated.     Market Surplus in this context is 
defined as the sum of the producer/supplier surplus and 
consumer/buyer surplus.  Producer surplus is derived 
whenever the price the producer receives exceeds the 
value they are willing to accept for the goods they sell.  
Similarly, consumer surplus is derived whenever the 
price the consumer ends up paying for a good is below 
the value they are prepared to pay.  Market surplus is 
the sum of individual surpluses over all 
consumers/buyers and producers/sellers participating 
in the market.  
The appropriate transient optimization solution 
dynamically allocates pipeline capacity among 
transactions between suppliers and consumers based on 
the economic value of these transactions.  Compressor 
operations and line pack are optimized in conjunction 
with the selection of location-dependent offers to sell, 
and bids to buy, natural gas.  Location-based (nodal) 
prices of natural gas are computed as dual variables 
corresponding to the nodal flow balance constraints in 
the optimal solution, and reflect the time- and location-
dependent economic value of gas in the network.  
Reference [8] introduces the Locational Trade Values 
(LTVs) of natural gas as shadow prices of the nodal 
flow balance constraints.  One of the key results of that 
paper is the proof of the revenue adequacy of the 
market settlement mechanism based on LTVs.   
The objective of the current paper is to introduce 
the proposed design of the Gas Balancing Market 
(GBM) as a critical element for economically efficient 
gas-electric coordination. This coordination 
mechanism will facilitate the timely exchange of both 
physical and pricing data between participants in each 
market, with price formation in both markets being 
fully consistent with the physics of energy flow. 
Physical data would be intra-day (e.g., hourly) gas 
schedules (burn and delivery) and pricing data would 
be bids and offers reflecting willingness to pay and to 
accept. Location-based gas prices would be obtained 
using optimization of transient pipeline flow models.  
Inputs to the pipeline optimization problem include 
prices that power plants are willing to pay for gas, as 
derived from nodal electricity prices that are produced 
by power system optimization.   
  
 
2. Gas Balancing Market  
 
2.1. Motivation 
 
Electric and natural gas networks follow distinct 
but inter-related decision processes of scheduling their 
operations.  The timeline of these processes are 
schematically presented in Fig. 1. As one can see in 
this timeline, there exists a highly intricate succession 
of decision cycles on the electric side and natural gas 
side. A gas-fired generating unit considering to operate 
on the next electric day (which begins at midnight) 
should submit an offer to the Day-Ahead market on the 
prior day by 10:30 AM Eastern Time.  Prior to that, the 
asset manager for the unit would line up gas supply 
and delivery.  Supply will be arranged at a pipeline 
receipt point at a bilaterally negotiated price.  Shipment 
of gas from the receipt point to the delivery point on 
the pipeline could be arranged on a firm basis through 
the capacity release mechanism or on a non-firm basis 
by obtaining interruptible capacity. This process yields 
a preliminary supply arrangements and gas prices.  
These prices, although not backed up by delivery 
guarantee, inform electric generators on how to bid in 
the day-ahead (DA) electricity market.  This process 
exposes transacting parties to various kinds of risk.   
Once the DA market clears and the financially 
binding operational schedules for electric generators 
are determined, generators have just enough time to 
make delivery nominations with the pipeline for the 
next gas day.  If the nominations are confirmed in the 
Timely and/or Evening cycles on the gas side, daily 
delivery quantities are essentially guaranteed. 
However, even if confirmed, the quantities needed by 
the generator may be different from those preliminary 
arranged and the difference must be settled between 
the parties. 
If deliveries needed by the generator are not 
confirmed due to pipeline capacity limitations, 
generators will face significant financial exposure as 
they are obligated to deliver power but have no gas to 
produce it.  This financial exposure is two-fold:  
generator may need to acquire under-delivered power 
in the real-time market and also may be facing non-
performance penalties if the electric under-delivery 
occurs at the time of scarcity. 
Even if the daily delivery quantity is confirmed, the 
pipeline typically expects that gas will be taken in 
equal quantities in each hour of the gas day (a ratable 
quantity).   Generators, however, need non-ratable 
quantity which pipelines may be able to accommodate 
but cannot guarantee.   
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Furthermore, most fast-start combined cycle 
generators and gas turbine peaking facilities are not 
committed in the DA market.  Instead those units are 
typically scheduled through the hourly reliability 
updates or close to the real-time market.  These “last-
minute” decisions simply do not fit into the existing 
decision cycles on the gas side. For these generators 
which are critical for maintaining reliability of the 
electric service and providing essential ancillary 
services there is no transparent mechanism on the gas 
side under which they can purchase gas and schedule 
delivery as needed. Sudden ramps required by these 
generators may cause operational problems on the 
pipeline side.  If these generators receive no gas, this 
will jeopardize operational reliability of the electrical 
grid, while delivering gas to these units may jeopardize 
reliability of the pipeline system. 
 We propose to solve these problems through the 
formation of the hour-by-hour natural gas balancing 
market that would allow market participants to trade 
deviations from approved ratable schedules in the 
Timely and Evening Cycles.   
These deviations could be traded through the 
formal optimization based auction-type market 
mechanism as described in the next section.   Such an 
auction could be run on an hourly basis using a rolling 
horizon approach, such that each hour the auction 
would optimize the system for multiple hours (e.g. 36 
hours or even more).  Such a balancing market would 
provide a repeated forward-looking price discovery 
mechanism to help the gas and electric sectors to 
efficiently coordinate their operations.  
 
2.2. Gas Balancing Market in Words 
 
The proposed Gas Balancing Market (GBM) will 
have voluntary participation and will be administered 
by a pipeline specific market administrator. 
 GBM will function as a two-sided auction 
conducted on the gas pipeline network and 
administered by the Market Operator.  Network nodes 
are primarily custodial meters where gas change hands, 
compressor stations and pipe interconnection points.  
Network edges are pipes physically connecting nodes.  
Auction participants are buyers and sellers of gas 
submitting price/quantity (P/Q) offers/bids to sell/buy 
gas at network nodes.  Their buy/sell positions are 
primarily driven by the need to buy gas above the 
ratable schedules or the desire to sell gas in excess of 
ratable schedules.  Thus, the same market participant 
may act as a buyer in one hours and as a seller in 
another hour.  Ratable schedules would be based on 
deliveries confirmed at the Timely or Evening 
nomination cycle.  In addition, the market would allow 
participation of buyers and sellers which have no day-
ahead confirmed schedules or firm capacity rights.  
Offers and bids are submitted with an hourly time 
step for a multi-hour optimization horizon (e.g., 36 
hours).   
Auctioneer’s objective function is to maximize, 
over the optimization horizon, the market surplus 
between accepted bids and offers less compressor costs 
of running the pipeline. 
The auction repeats periodically (e.g. every hour) 
as shown in Fig. 2, which also depicts the transition of 
this repeated auction from one gas day to another. 
The optimization problem is formulated subject to 
the dynamic transient pipeline flow equations and must 
satisfy key engineering constraints.  The latter are 
limitations on the maximum allowed operating 
pressure at each pipe, minimum pressure requirements 
at each node, horsepower limitations and compression 
ratios of compressors. 
The outcome of the auction includes: 
 Hourly schedules for receipt and deliveries of 
natural gas over the optimization horizon for each 
buyer and seller and for each node of the network.  
These schedules are the net results of ratable 
schedules and buy/sell positions cleared in the 
market; 
 Hourly shadow prices of nodal mass balance 
equations referred to as Locational Trade Values 
(LTVs) of natural gas; 
 Operational compressor setting and compression 
ratios for each compressor station; 
 Pressure dynamics at pipes and nodes; 
 Market clearing for the first hour of the 
optimization horizon will be ex post to actual 
deliveries in that hour.  Market clearings for  all 
subsequent hours of that horizon will be ex ante; 
 All cleared positions for all hours of the 
optimization horizon will be financially binding. 
 
These market results will be financially binding, thus 
giving gas buyers and sellers assurance of obtaining 
needed gas or liquidating an excess supply at a price 
that is acceptable and known ahead of the delivery.  
Since the market is cleared multiple times for the same 
period, future uncertainties are resolved. This is 
because the positions taken in earlier instances of the 
GBM could be liquidated at a later time if necessary.  
In sum, the proposed market structure will provide a 
transparent and efficient mechanism for nearly real-
time gas trading and corresponding price discovery. 
   The proposed GBM timing is aligned with 
nomination cycles that are in place for natural gas 
pipeline in the United States.  The first trading of a 
particular GBM cycle is aligned with the completion of 
the Evening Nomination Cycle (21:00 Central Time) 
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and would have an optimization horizon of 36 hours 
which will cover the remaining portion of the current 
gas day (from 21:00 to 09:00 of the following day) and 
the entire gas day from 09:00 of the following day to 
09:00 of the day after.  The next trading will occur at 
22:00 and will have an optimization horizon of 35 
hours also ending at 09:00 of the day after the 
following day. 
Because the optimization is conducted subject to 
the gas flow physics and engineering constraints, 
market clearing assures feasibility of delivery 
schedules identified.   
 
 
3. The GBM Optimization Problem  
 
3.1. Pipeline Network Representation 
 
The GBM market clearing process is designed as a 
large-scale, system-wide transient optimization of a 
pipeline network operation.  Although we employ 
several simplifications for the purpose of this paper, 
the modeling can be extended to capture more complex 
physical and engineering aspects.  Specifically, we 
assume isothermal flow through a horizontal pipeline 
with constant gas composition, and where gas 
compressibility is specified using the CNGA method in 
the equation of state [10, 11]. We also assume that 
flow changes are sufficiently slow so as not to excite 
waves or shocks, so that second order terms may be 
removed from the dynamic equations, and relatively 
coarse discretizations in both space and time may be 
used.  The important parameters for a pipe are length, 
diameter, and the Colebrook-White friction factor.  The 
dynamics of gas flow within the pipe can then be 
modeled using the isothermal Euler equations in one 
dimension, with the inertia and gravity terms omitted 
[12,13].   
For simplicity in this paper, compressor stations 
and regulator elements are modeled as two-ended flow 
devices that can enforce the given time-dependent 
pressures on a specified side, such as the discharge 
pressure. Theoretical power for compressors is 
computed as a simple function of volumetric flow rate 
  and compression ratio , given by 
11 1| | [max( , ) ]h    , where h=(γ-1)/γ, and γ is the 
specific heat capacity ratio of the gas.  In this paper we 
do not model removal of gas from the pipeline to fuel 
compressor station operation, as it is a relatively small 
quantity of the through-flow (e.g. 0.25%) and does not 
significantly affect marginal prices.   
We consider a system of pipes, compressors, and 
regulators that are connected at nodes.  Within the 
pipes, the mass flux and density evolve according to 
the simplified Euler equations. This collection of 
elements connected at nodes is considered as a directed 
graph G=(V,E), where each segment e={i,j}∈E is 
an edge that connects two nodes i and j in the set of 
nodes V.  The instantaneous state within an edge is 
characterized by the pressure 
ij
p  and flow 
ij
 , which 
for pipes are functions of both time on an interval [0, 
T] and space on an interval [0, Le], where T is the 
optimization horizon and Le is the length of pipe 
segment e. We assign a positive flow direction on each 
pipe, and then derive equations that relate the pressure 
and flow at the boundaries of a pipe segment to the 
conditions at a node.  Each node is classified as either a 
pressure (slack) node j∈V P, where a pressure profile pj 
in time is specified and flow is a free variable, or a 
flow node j∈VF, where the time-dependent flow dj 
entering or leaving the network is specified and 
pressure is free. At least one pressure node must be 
included in the model so that there is a degree of 
freedom in flow to ensure that the initial value problem 
in simulations used to validate the optimization 
solution is well-posed.  This will typically be a large 
source point, such as a supply interconnection or 
storage unit, where the pressure is a given boundary 
condition. An illustration and a more detailed 
description of the variables used in such reduced nodal 
modeling are illustrated in Figure 3.  Each node must 
satisfy the Kirchhoff-Neumann flow balance condition 
that requires mass moving through the node to be 
conserved.  This stipulates that the sum of incoming 
flows is equal to the sum of outgoing flows plus any 
consumption dj at that node.  Each specified flow node 
j∈VD is also assigned an internal nodal pressure, pj 
which serves as an auxiliary variable.  A compressor 
can boost the pressure difference between pipe 
segments attached at its inlet and outlet nodes.  This 
induces extra compatibility equations into the 
description of the coupled system of differential 
equations.   
Numerical simulations using the referenced 
representation of pipeline networks are validated in [9] 
where simulated results are benchmarked against 
SCADA measurements for a segment of Tennessee 
pipeline.  
 
3.2. Optimization Problem Formulation 
We formulate an optimal control problem (OCP) 
subject to partial differential equation (PDE) 
constraints for gas pipeline networks, for which the 
edge dynamics and nodal conditions described above 
form the dynamic constraints.  The aim is to maximize 
an economic objective function in the form of the 
market surplus.  This market surplus is maximized in 
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total over the optimization horizon [0,T] which may be 
a 24-hour day or longer.  At each point in time, market 
surplus is computed as the difference between the the 
economic value consumers (buyers) are placing on 
(willing to pay for) gas purchases  at nodes j 
minus the value of gas which producers (sellers) are 
placing on (willing to accept for) gas sales  at 
nodes j.    The inputs to the problem consist of the bid 
and offer prices  and , respectively that 
buyers or sellers at a node j are willing to pay or accept 
at time t within the optimization horizon [0,T].  In 
addition to price bids, quantity bids are also supplied in 
the form of pre-existing contracts , minimum 
and maximum offtake curves   and  
of buyers, and minimum and maximum supply curves  
 and  of suppliers.  The economic 
objective is maximized subject to a collection of 
constraints that describe pipeline system operation, and 
where the control variables include compression ratios 
 of gas compressors or compression ratios in 
the system.  The PDE dynamics for gas flow on each 
pipe (i,j) are enforced, as well as flow balance at each 
node j and pressure changes caused by compression.  
Inequality constraints include minimum and maximum 
limits on pressure on each pipe, maximum power limits 
of each compressor, and maximum and minimum 
withdrawals or injections for buyers and sellers.  For 
simplicity, we choose terminal conditions on the state 
and control variables to be time-periodic.  Alternative 
initial and terminal conditions such as mass balance 
over the optimization period on certain subsystems 
could be included instead.   
Crucially, we assume that no discrete changes to 
the network topology occur during the optimization 
period.  Thus, no discrete variables, such as binary 
on/off switches, are included in the formulation. While 
compressor stations are in reality subject to complex 
operational limitations, we demonstrate that, in 
principle, nonlinear station constraints can be included 
in a computationally tractable manner as long as the 
modeling does not include on/off variables.  For 
instance, a large compressor station with multiple (e.g. 
a dozen or more) units that receive flow from a 
common feeder and deliver flow to a common header 
can be modeled as a single theoretical boost ratio for 
the purpose of optimization.  Modern compressor 
stations often have control systems that can be set to 
track a set point or reference signal for discharge 
pressure or horsepower.  Thus we suppose that the 
management of individual units is automated, and 
focus on the large-scale system effects of control 
actions while supposing that subsystems can be taken 
care of at a local level.  The optimization problem is 
stated as follows: 
 
Maximization of market surplus 
 
0 0
ˆ ˆmax ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
T T
d s
j j j j
j V j V
c t d t dt c t s t dt
 
     (1) 
s.t. 
 Mass conservation 
 0 ,   
t ij x ij
i j E     ( , ) . (2) 
 Momentum conservation 
 
   , 
2
ij ij ij
t ij x ij ij w
ij ij
f
Z p RT i j E
D p
 
      
| |
( ) ( , ) .  (3) 
 Equation of state 
  ,   
ij ij w ij
p Z p RT i j E ( ) ( , ) .   (4) 
 Nodal flow balance 
 
0  ,    
jk jk ij ij j
j j i j
j j
A t A t q t
s t d t j V
 
 
 
 
   
 ( ) ( ) ( )
ˆˆ( ( ) ( )) .
  (5) 
 Compressor boost 
 
 ,   
    
ij ij i
ij ij j
p t t p t i j E
p t t p t i j E


 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( , ) ,
( ) ( ) ( ), ( , ) .
  (6) 
 Pressure limits 
0  ,   
,    
ij ij ij
ij ij ij ij
p p t p i j E
p p t L p i j E
  
  
min max
min max
( , ) ( , ) ,
( , ) ( , ) .
  (7) 
 Boost upper limits 
 
 
1 ,    
1  ,   
h
ij ij ij ij
h
ij ij ij ij
t t E i j E
t t E i j E
  
  
  
  
max
max
| ( ) | ( ( )) ( , ) ,
| ( ) | ( ( )) ( , ) .
 
 (8) 
Boost lower limits 
 1  1   ( ) , ( ) ( , )
ij ij
t t i j E    . (9) 
Supply limits 
 min maxˆ( ) ( ) ( )
j j j
s t s t s t  . (10) 
Demand limits 
 min maxˆ( ) ( ) ( )
j j j
d t d t d t  . (11) 
 
Additional constraints that require the total mass 
of gas in the system at the end of the optimization 
horizon to return to the initial state may be added. 
Equations (1) – (11) use the following notations: 
V :  set of nodes 
E :  set of pipes 
T :  length of the optimization horizon 
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R :  gas constant (depends on gas gravity) 
w
T :working temperature (assumed constant 
throughout the system) 
( )Z  : gas compressibility as a function of pressure 
(working temperature) 
ij
f :  Colebrook-White friction on pipe ( , )i j   
ij
D :  diameter of pipe ( , )i j  
ij
A :  cross-sectional area of pipe ( , )i j  
ij
L :  length of pipe ( , )i j  
s
j
c  : supply offer price at node j  at time t   
d
j
c :demand bid price at node j  at time t   
ˆˆ ( ), ( )
j j
s t d t  : variable supply and demand at node j  at 
time t   
( , )
ij
t x  : density on pipe ( , )i j  at time t and location 
x   
( , )
ij
p t x  : pressure on pipe ( , )i j  at time t and location 
x   
( , )
ij
t x  : mass flux on pipe ( , )i j  at time t and 
location x   
ij ij
p t p t( ), ( ) :  pressure at the inlet and outlet of pipe 
( , )i j  at time t  
ij ij
t t ( ), ( ) :  mass flux at the inlet and outlet of pipe 
( , )i j  at time t  
ij ij
p pmin max, :  minimum and maximum pressure on pipe 
( , )i j  
ij ij
 , :  compressor energy usage factor of 
compressors at the inlet and outlet of pipe ( , )i j   
ij ij
t t ( ), ( ) :  boost ratios of compressors at the inlet 
and outlet of pipe ( , )i j  
h :  compressor energy function exponent (depends on 
gas specific eat capacity ratio) 
ij ij
E Emax max, :  maximum energy (horsepower) of 
compressors at the inlet and outlet of pipe ( , )i j  
j j
s t s tmin max( ), ( ) :  minimum and maximum supply from 
node j  at time t  
j j
d t d tmin max( ), ( ) :  minimum and maximum demand at 
node j  at time t  
 
 
4. On the Coordination Dynamics  
  
The coordination dynamics between the gas and 
electric networks could be envisioned as a periodic 
exchange of physical and pricing information.   
   Consider the end of the Evening Cycle as a point at 
which GBM has the longest optimization horizon 
which lasts through the end of the current gas day and 
through the next gas day (total of 36 hours). Once this 
cycle of the GBM clears, it yields a 36-hour long 
projection of LTVs.  Gas-fired generators could use 
these LTVs to update their real-time bids to the 
electricity market for the next hour and to update their 
gas purchasing decisions for future hours in which the 
generator may have been scheduled to operate as an 
outcome of the previously cleared DA market.   
   While Generators can use LTVs to develop their 
price offers in the electric market, they can use electric 
LMPs to develop bids and offers in the GBM. Indeed, 
consider a generating unit scheduled in the DA market 
to operate in a future hour.  Its projected gas use in that 
hour is greater than the daily ratable quantity (total 
daily gas use divided by 24) and therefore in that hour, 
the generator needs to purchase gas in the balancing 
market.  The price the generator will be willing to pay 
for that additional gas could be as high as  
max ( )/C LMP R VOM H    
where 
maxC is the gas price ceiling, LMP is the electric 
LMP at the generator’s node, VOM is the non-fuel 
variable operating and maintenance costs of generator, 
and H is the generator’s heat rate.  The term R  
reflects an additional risk premium generators would 
factor into their willingness to pay for gas to avoid 
excess charges they may face in the real-time 
electricity market and potentially high non-
performance penalties during scarcity events. 
Additional risk factor may be needed for cycling 
generators at times when they operate at their 
minimum capacity when electricity prices that are too 
low to recover their operating costs. 
   On the other hand, if in a future hour the generator is 
long on gas (for example, if it is not scheduled to 
operate in that hour but it is still expected to take a 
ratable quantity of gas), it will be willing to sell that 
gas in the GBM.  Simplistically, the price floor the 
generator may be willing to accept could be as low as 
zero, although dynamic consideration and/or 
opportunity/obligations to provide ancillary services 
may affect these pricing considerations. 
   Even a relatively simplistic coordination mechanism 
as described here will likely result in an improved 
overall gas-electric system efficiency. Indeed, pipeline 
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congestion will be reflected in higher LTVs at certain 
locations.  Generating units taking gas at these 
locations will see higher hourly prices and translate 
those into higher bids submitted to the electricity 
market. Electric System Operator could respond by 
reducing output of such generators and to the extent 
possible will be replacing them with generation with 
lower cost of gas or other fuels.  That in turn will 
reduce demand for natural gas at constrained pipeline 
locations and therefore relieve pipeline congestion and 
reduce natural gas prices to other consumers.   
 
5. Policy Implications  
 
    The design of the proposed GBM mechanism is 
particularly suitable for the regulatory structure and 
market design currently in place in the United States.  
GBM will require minimal regulatory reform and is 
intended to keep the existing and vibrant market 
structure in place in the USA intact. 
   As stated earlier in Section 2.2, we envision GBM as 
a pipeline-specific market which does not necessarily 
require the formation of a regional organization to 
coordinate the operations of several interconnected 
pipelines.  GBM can be instituted at a pipeline level 
and could also be set to serve only a part of the 
pipeline system, to simplify an initial implementation.   
   We propose also that participation in the GBM be 
voluntary. Market participants that are satisfied with 
the existing operational and market mechanism are not 
required to submit bids or offers into the GBM.   
   We chose the proposed timing associated with the 
GBM decision cycles to minimize its impact on the 
operation of the current market and scheduling 
decision cycles.  GBM will have little or no operational 
overlap with the existing day-ahead trading of natural 
gas, supply nominations and scheduling.  By design, 
GBM is a market that is added to where none exists. 
These factors should reduce the hurdles for 
implementing the GBM within the regulatory structure 
of interstate pipelines regulated by FERC and possibly 
by intrastate pipeline in jurisdiction of state regulators, 
   Participation in the GBM offers benefits to market 
participations both on the gas side and on the electric 
side.  On the gas side, the GBM will provide relief of 
pipeline constraints through LTV-sensitive 
optimization of compressors helping to determine the 
most efficient line pack strategy over time and across 
the system to assure higher delivery to locations with 
the highest value of gas.  At the same time, redispatch 
of electric generation in response to dynamically 
formed LTVs will provide additional relief of pipeline 
constraints.  In the long run, creation of the GBM will 
help pipeline customers make investment decisions.  
Gas-fired generators, especially those owned by the 
Independent Power Producers, are reluctant to enter 
long-term contracts for Firm Transportation capacity. 
Generation owners are exposed to a significant 
financial risk of not being able to recover fixed cost 
costs associated with holding FT transportation rights 
at the time when the power plant is running.  The 
existing capacity release mechanism and daily pricing 
structure do not provide sufficient price granularity to 
help generating companies appropriately evaluate the 
risk of making a decision to acquire long-term FT 
rights.  With the GBM in place, a generating company 
can rely on the associated price discovery mechanism 
with hourly granularity to assess the value of FT rights 
when those are under-utilized.  That risk exposure 
could be compared to the risk exposure on the electric 
side and associated with the generator non-
performance due to inability to acquire gas deliveries.  
   LTV-based pricing will help pipeline owners to 
better identify constrained system elements with better 
granularity.  Using LTV-based pricing, pipeline 
owners could more precisely assess economic benefits 
of alternative solutions and justify investments in 
economic solutions before regulatory agencies. 
   On the electric side, gas-fired generators could rely 
on hourly gas trade values (LTVs) to support bidding 
into DA and RT markets leading to a more efficient 
commitment and dispatch of the electrical grid.  
Relying on GBM will simplify gas purchases for gas-
fired fast-start power plants that clear in the real-time 
power markets and/or that are called upon to provide 
ancillary services.  Redispatch of electric generation 
will reduce electricity prices in response to high gas 
LTV under scarcity caused by pipeline constraints.  
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Figure 1. Gas-Electric Decision Cycles 
Figure 2.  Succession of GMB clearings 
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 Figure 3 – Diagram of nodal control system modeling for large-scale gas transmission 
pipelines.  Given a directed graph that represents the pipeline network, 
ij
p  and ijp  represent 
pressures at the sending and receiving ends of each pipe, while 
ij
  and ij  represent mass flux 
at the sending and receiving ends of each pipe.  The quantities ij  and ij  represent pressure 
boost ratios of compressors that are, without loss of generality, located at every interface 
between a node and a pipe.  Thus, nodal pressures ip  and jp  are related to pipe endpoint 
pressures 
ij
p  and ijp  according to iijij pp   and jijij pp  .  The withdrawal from the 
network at a node j  is denoted by jd , which is constructed from pre-existing contracts )(tq j  
and secondary supply and demand profiles )(ˆ ts j  and )(
ˆ td j , or the supply injected at a node i 
is denoted by  js .   
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